Blurring the distinction between empirical and normative legitimacy? A commentary on ‘police legitimacy and citizen cooperation in China’ by Jackson, Jonathan & Bradford, Ben
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 3335644. 
© Jonathan Jackson and Ben Bradford. Users may download and/or print one copy to 
facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. Users may not engage in further 
distribution of this material or use it for any profit-making activities or any other form of 
commercial gain. 
 
 
 
 
Blurring the Distinction Between Empirical 
and Normative Legitimacy?  
A Commentary on ‘Police Legitimacy and 
Citizen Cooperation in China’ 
 
 
Jonathan Jackson and Ben Bradford 
 
 
 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 5/2019 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Law Department 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335644 
  
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=[number]. 
 
Blurring the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative 
Legitimacy? A Commentary on ‘Police Legitimacy and 
Citizen Cooperation in China’ 
 
 
Jonathan Jackson and Ben Bradford* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: In a fascinating paper on the nature of police legitimacy in Southern China, Sun et 
al. (2018) present evidence that what have previously been treated as possible sources of 
legitimacy—public perceptions of police procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and 
lawfulness—are in fact constituent components of legitimacy. We argue in this paper, that the 
empirical strategy used to reach this conclusion is not fit for purpose because both conceptual 
stances—possible sources of legitimacy or constituent components of legitimacy—are consistent with the 
same fitted statistical model. Ironically, therefore, Sun and colleagues end up assuming rather 
than discovering the normative bases on which people judge police legitimacy. To be sensitive 
to cultural context means using a methodology that does not a priori impose the preconditions 
of legitimacy. We illustrate this general point by analysing nationally representative data from 
30 countries across Europe and beyond. 
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The concept of legitimacy has moved centre-stage in police research. Police are 
empowered to use whatever level of force is deemed necessary to deal with issues 
of crime and disorder, so questions concerning their rightful use of power are 
never far from the political surface. Normative concerns about police powers are 
ever-present in the debates that almost continuously roil around policing. Yet, 
police in liberal democracies rely on the legitimacy they command and the public 
cooperation, deference and compliance it engenders, and this raises empirical 
concerns about the extent to which the policed hold the police legitimate. 
The past decade and more has seen the pathbreaking United States–based 
work of Tom Tyler and colleagues into the causes and consequences of perceived 
police legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b) spread across the 
world. Studies have been carried out in social, political and legal contexts as 
diverse as Ghana, Finland, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, 
Sweden, Japan, Israel, Australia, Turkey, South Africa, France, Ukraine, China, and 
Nigeria. In many of these countries procedural justice seems to be the most 
important predictor of legitimacy: namely, legitimacy seems to rest a good deal on 
the extent to which police officers act in fair, neutral, transparent and trustworthy 
ways when making decisions and interacting with the public (see Jackson 2018, for 
a review of the international literature).   
Sun et al.’s (2018) recently published paper into police legitimacy in a coastal 
city in Southern China is an excellent example of the increasingly international 
nature of this field of enquiry (see also Tsushima & Hamai 2015; Kim et al. 2018; 
Akinlabi & Murphy 2018). Sensitivity to context is important to their work. China 
is an authoritarian regime, so it has ‘low accountability and high coercion’, hence 
people’s feelings of obligation to obey external legal authority may be complex and 
varied. But people may also judge the legitimacy of the police on the basis of 
procedural justice (fair process) and distributive justice (fair aggregate allocation of 
outcomes) and effectiveness against crime and lawfulness:  
 
the police in an authoritarian state are commonly empowered with excessive 
authorities that do not match normative expectations of democratic policing 
(e.g., procedural fairness, institutional transparency, and accountability). 
Authoritarian policing is thus prone to abusive treatments of the public and 
state manipulative efforts of performance. Lawfulness, distributive justice, 
and effectiveness, originally proposed by Tyler as less imperative than 
procedural justice, could play a different or even an enlarged role in shaping 
police legitimacy under an authoritarian setting. (Sun et al. 2018: 2). 
 
Drawing on data from a city-wide survey, they conclude from their analysis that 
these four judgements are so strongly bound up with legitimacy that they collectively 
constitute the perceived right to rule. In other words, rather than legitimacy being an 
overarching judgement about the right to power and the authority to govern—that 
may or may not be influenced by public judgements about whether police tend to 
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act in procedurally just, distributively just, effective and lawful ways—legitimacy is 
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. Their study 
raises important questions regarding the importance of context in police-citizen 
relations, the conceptualisation and measurement of legitimacy, and the role of the 
researcher in (a) allowing the preconditions of legitimacy to be an empirical 
question discovered bottom-up or (b) imposing the preconditions of legitimacy onto 
a given political community top-down. 
Our goals in this paper are twofold. First, while Sun et al. (2018) makes a 
notable contribution to the literature, we question in these pages whether the 
analytical strategy used to assess the legitimacy measurement model is fit for purpose. 
More specifically, we argue that the analytical strategy is not a good adjudication 
tool because both conceptual stances (procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness as either possible sources of legitimacy or constituent 
components of legitimacy) are consistent with the same fitted confirmatory factor 
analysis model. Second (and relatedly) we make the case that their approach lacks 
cultural sensitivity because it ends up being the outside expert who is deciding 
what criteria people use to judge institutional legitimacy, not the people 
themselves. We illustrate this general point by analysing data from a 30-country 
study. 
The paper proceeds as follows. By way of conceptual ground-clearing we 
distinguish between the normative concept of legitimacy of political philosophers 
and the empirical concept of legitimacy of social scientists. After summarising the 
standard approach to studying empirical legitimacy in the context of the police, we 
review the original work of Tankebe (2013) whom Sun and colleagues sought to 
replicate, and then discuss Sun et al.’s (2018) approach. Following the findings 
from our own empirical study into the measurement of legitimacy in 30 countries, 
we conclude with some thoughts on future directions of research in this area. 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Political philosophers often employ legitimacy as a normatively-laden term to 
describe whether state institutions meet an inherently value-based set of 
substantive criteria regarding how they ought to be configured if their power is to 
be judged as rightfully held. In the context of the criminal justice system, a 
Western democratic conception of normative legitimacy might involve a group of 
outside experts deciding that institutions should be judged by according to 
principles of independence, transparency, accountability and other features of the 
rule of law.  
By contrast, social scientists typically employ legitimacy as an empirically-
laden concept to describe whether—as a matter of fact—those that are subject to 
authority confer legitimacy on that authority (Tyler 2006a, 2006b; Calderia & 
Gibson 1995; Gibson et al. 2003; Justice & Meares 2014; Meares 2017; Trinkner et 
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al. 2018). The empirical concept of legitimacy focuses on whether an institution 
finds ‘the approval of those who have to abide by it’ (Hinsch 2010: 40). Legitimacy 
is premised on a fundamental accord between rulers and ruled (Filiangeiri 1783-88, in 
Pardo 2000: 5) that is founded in shared norms and values and established via the 
‘moral performance’ (Liebling 2004) of power-holders. 
In the context of the police, social scientists typically operationalize empirical 
legitimacy along two connected lines: 
 
1. normative justifiability of power in the eyes of citizens (the right to rule): 
do citizens believe that the police as an institution is just, proper and 
appropriate?  
2. recognition of rightful authority (the authority to govern): do citizens 
believe that police officers are entitled to be obeyed?   
 
The empirical legitimacy process involves acceptance (or rejection) of the implicit 
and explicit claims that police make to be a morally appropriate institution that has 
the right to expect obedience and support from the public. On the one hand, 
people judge the normative appropriateness of the police as an institution against 
societal norms of conduct of officials (e.g. do police officers make neutral and 
objective decisions when dealing with citizens?) and draw relevant conclusions 
regarding the legitimacy of the institution that officers embody and represent. On 
the other hand, the sources of legitimacy (i.e. the bases on which its presence or 
absence is judged by citizens) emerge from empirical enquiry. They are not 
assumed a priori on the basis of political, moral, legal, religious or some other 
philosophy.  
 
THE STANDARD APPROACH TO STUDYING EMPIRICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Researchers typically (a) operationalise legitimacy as a psychological construct, (b) 
treat the normative appropriateness part of the legitimacy construct as an 
overarching judgment, and (c) allow the criteria that people use to judge legitimacy 
to be an empirical question. This strategy depends on distinguishing between 
potential sources of legitimacy (how officers are perceived to act) and overarching 
legitimacy judgements (whether the institution is seen to have the right to power 
and authority to govern). Because of the abstract nature of institutional legitimacy, 
researchers focus on the general appropriateness of the actions of officers who 
embody the institution, and to avoid imposing specific value content, measures of 
legitimacy are worded in general ways (like ‘the police usually act in ways that are 
consistent with your sense of right and wrong’ and ‘the police generally have the 
same sense of right and wrong as I do’) rather than in more specific ways (like 
‘how often do the police treat people with respect and dignity?’ and ‘how effective 
are the police in preventing burglaries from happening?’). Researchers then use 
statistical analysis to assess whether, for instance, procedural justice and 
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effectiveness judgements are the most important predictors of legitimacy, and if 
they are, then the inference is that these are two sources of police legitimacy. 
In a recent example Huq et al. (2017) presented findings from a nationally 
representative sample survey of the UK that measured the following constructs: 
 
1. Public attitudes towards whether officers act in procedurally just ways; 
2. Public attitudes towards whether officers act in distributively just ways; 
3. Public attitudes towards whether officers act in effective ways; 
4. Public attitudes towards whether officers respect the limits of their rightful 
authority; 
5. Public attitudes towards whether officers use appropriate surveillance 
powers; 
6. Perceived institutional legitimacy: normative alignment; and, 
7. Perceived institutional legitimacy: duty to obey. 
 
Aziz Huq and colleagues first used confirmatory factor analysis to assess whether 
the seven constructs can reasonably be treated as empirically distinct albeit 
positively correlated constructs (an important first stage of analysis that we will 
return to). Having found evidence for empirical distinctiveness, they then used 
structural equation modelling to assess the extent to which each of the first five 
constructs predicted normative alignment and duty to obey (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Testing the possible sources of legitimacy1 2 
 
1 PJ = procedural justice; DJ = distributive justice; EFF = effectiveness; BA = bounded authority; SP = 
surveillance practices; NA = normative alignment; DO = duty to obey.  
2 CFA indicated that the constructs are equally distinct and positively correlated, and that there are good 
scaling properties. 
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Huq et al. (2017) found (a) that procedural justice and bounded authority were the 
key predictors of normative alignment and (b) that normative alignment and 
effectiveness were the key predictors of duty to obey. The conclusion was that the 
legitimacy (operationalised as normative appropriateness) of the police as an 
institution in the UK is judged most strongly on the basis of officers acting in 
procedurally just ways and respecting the limits of their rightful authority (two 
legitimating societal norms). Put another way, citizens seem to judge the legitimacy 
of the police as an institution in part on whether officers respect the limits of their 
rightful authority, treat people with respect and dignity, talk and listen to people, 
and act in unbiased, transparent, and accountable ways. In turn, normative 
alignment and police effectiveness were both predictors of willing consent to 
rightful authority. 
The majority of studies using this approach have found that the most 
important predictor of legitimacy is the extent to which people think that officers 
act in procedurally just ways. This is the case in the US (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; 
Reisig et al. 2007; White et al. 2016), UK (Huq et al. 2011; Bradford 2014), 
Australia (Murphy & Cherney 2012; Murphy et al. 2018), Israel (Mentovich et al. 
2018), China (Sun et al. 2017), and in Continental Europe (Hough et al. 2013; 
Dirikx & Ven den Bulck 2013). Notably, however, effectiveness and lawfulness 
judgements do seem to play a more important role in predicting empirical 
legitimacy in Pakistan and South Africa (Jackson et al. 2014; Bradford et al. 2014). 
The idea here is that normative judgements about fair process can to some degree 
be crowded out by concerns about police effectiveness and corruption, the sheer 
scale of the crime problem, and/or the association of the police with a historically 
oppressive and underperforming state. 
 
 
 
POLICE LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC COOPERATION IN 
SOUTHERN CHINA 
 
What, then, of Sun et al.’s (2018) study? Rather than using the above approach to 
assess whether legitimacy depends not only on procedural justice but also 
effectiveness, distributive justice and lawfulness, they used Tankebe’s (2013) 
empirical strategy to adjudicate between the following two conceptual stances: 
 
1. procedural justice, effectiveness, distributive justice and lawfulness are 
possible sources of legitimacy (where one then uses statistical modelling to 
determine the empirical importance of each one, see e.g. Huq et al. 2017); 
or, 
2. procedural justice, effectiveness, distributive justice and lawfulness are 
constituent components of legitimacy (where they are so important that 
they collectively constitute the perceived right to power). 
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The details of the methodology used to adjudicate between these two 
positions are important. Sun et al. (2018) attempt to replicate Tankebe’s (2013) 
London-based study, so we first review the original study.  
Tankebe (2013) drew upon data from a survey of Londoners that measured 
among other things people’s perceptions of police procedural justice, distributive 
justice, effectiveness and lawfulness (using multiple indicators of each). He found 
that a four-factor model that distinguished between the four constructs fitted the 
data reasonably well (summarized in Figure 2). Given the constraints in the fitted 
CFA model—e.g. no cross-loadings or error covariances and conditional 
independence of items given the four latent factors—one can treat these four 
judgments as distinct, albeit correlated, latent constructs.  
 
Figure 2 Tankebe’s (2013) measurement model of legitimacy3 4 5  
 
3 Source: Tankebe J. (2013). Viewing things differently: The dimensions of public perceptions of 
legitimacy. Criminology, 51, 103–135. 
4 PJ = procedural justice; EF = effectiveness; DJ = distributive justice; LF = lawfulness. 
5 Fit statistics: X2 = 1056, df=98, p=<.005; CFI = .970; RMSEA = .044 (95% CI .041-.046). The model 
fitted the data, and the measures had good scaling properties. For Tankebe (2013), this constitutes 
evidence that what is being measured here must be constituent components of legitimacy not possible sources of 
legitimacy. 
.
78 
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Tankebe (2013) then tested whether effectiveness should be treated as a possible 
source of legitimacy or a constituent component of legitimacy. He fitted a three-
factor CFA model without the effectiveness indicators and effectiveness latent 
variable (i.e. dropping EF1-EF7 and the EF latent variable in Figure 2). He found 
that the three-factor model fitted the data, ran a chi-square difference test to 
compare the relative fit of the three-factor and four-factor models, and noting that 
both the three-factor model (when indicators of procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness, and lawfulness were included) and the four-factor model (when indicators 
of effectiveness, procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and lawfulness were 
included) both fitted the data, he deduced from this that: 
 
Effectiveness has to be viewed as a component of legitimacy; police 
organizations that seek legitimacy must demonstrate effectiveness as a 
normative requirement. Coicaud … has put this well: “Every political ruler 
who seeks to prove he possesses the right to govern [that is, is legitimate] has 
to satisfy, to try to satisfy, or to pretend to satisfy the needs of the members 
of the community.” For the police, those needs include safety and security. 
(Tankebe 2013: 121). 
 
Tankebe’s (2013) reasoning was simple. If the four-factor CFA model (Figure 1) 
fitted the data, then these four constructs should be labelled constituent components of 
legitimacy, not possible sources of legitimacy. In other words, the fitted model is 
incompatible with the notion that they are possible sources of legitimacy. The fact 
that the items scaled well; the fact that the analysis supported the idea that there 
were four underlying dimensions to the data; and the fact that these four factors 
were strongly and positive correlated (and that including effectiveness did not 
decrease the fit of the model) – all this means that legitimacy is procedural justice, 
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. 
 
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that what police researchers have persistently 
tended to use as predictors of legitimacy (procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness, lawfulness, and effectiveness) are rather the constituent parts of 
legitimacy … The results of the conﬁrmatory factor analysis presented in this 
study suggest that the debate [about whether legitimacy causes procedural 
justice or procedural justice causes legitimacy] might be redundant because 
procedural fairness is a constituent part of legitimacy rather than something 
apart from it. (Tankebe 2013: 125) 
 
In their replication study, Sun et al. (2018) also measured public attitudes towards 
police procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. Like 
Tankebe (2013), they also used confirmatory factor analysis to test a four-factor 
model. This time, however, they included a second-order factor that they labelled 
legitimacy, which means testing the idea that the second-order factor explains the 
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correlations between procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and 
lawfulness (specifically that the bivariate correlations can be modelled according to 
one underlying latent construct). Of note is the fact that Sun and colleagues could 
just as reasonably tested a model with two or three second-order factors, since 
there is no requirement in the literature for legitimacy to be uni-dimensional (see 
Jackson & Gau 2015). 
Sun et al. (2018) found that the model (reproduced in Figure 3) fitted the 
data, with (a) good scaling properties for each of the four sets of indicators, (b) 
four factors that were strongly and positively correlated, and (c) a second-order 
factor linked to each of the four first-order factors. Following the line of reasoning 
of Tankebe (2013) (see also Tankebe et al. 2016), they interpreted the findings as 
follows:  
 
the convergent validity, discriminant validity, and internal consistency of all 
key measures were supported in the CFA analysis and the reliability 
tests…Substantively, these results mean two things: (1) procedural justice, 
distributive justice, effectiveness, and lawfulness are four distinct sub-
constructs of legitimacy, and each sub-construct is well explained by its own 
corresponding observed variables, rather than by variables from a different 
sub-construct, and (2) the four sub-constructs correlate well with one another 
within their latent construct legitimacy. In short, Tankebe’s argument that 
procedural justice variables should be considered as indicators, rather than 
antecedents, of legitimacy, is supported. (Sun et al. 2018: 14). 
  
Figure 3 Sun et al.’s (2018) measurement model of legitimacy6 7 8 
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6 Source: Sun, I. Y., Li, L., Wu, Y., & Hu, R. (2018). Police legitimacy and citizen cooperation in China: 
testing an alternative model. Asian Journal of Criminology, 13(4), 275-291. 
7 LG = legitimacy; PJ = procedural justice; EF = effectiveness; DJ = distributive justice; LF = lawfulness. 
8 Fit statistics: X2 = 206, df=50, p=<.005; CFI = .982; TLI = .976; RMSEA = .058; and SRMR = .030. 
Because this model fitted the data, and because the measures had good scaling properties, Sun et al. 
(2018) argued that the second-order factor must be labeled possible sources of legitimacy not constituent 
components of legitimacy. 
 
It seems, then, that we have empirical evidence on what police legitimacy is, at 
least in the two current contexts. Legitimacy is not some overarching judgement 
about the normative appropriateness of the police, coupled with a felt moral duty 
to obey legal authorities, as specified by Tyler (2006a, 2006b), Huq et al. (2017) 
and others. We should not be assessing whether procedural justice, distributive 
justice, effectiveness and/or lawfulness explain variation in legitimacy. Legitimacy 
may not be predicted more strongly by procedural justice than by distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness (as typically found in extant work). Strikingly, the 
CFA modelling proves that legitimacy is procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness: if the police are to be viewed as legitimate in the 
current two contexts (see also Tankebe et al.’s 2016 work in the US and Ghana), 
police officers need to be seen to act in ways that are (a) procedurally just, (b) 
distributively just, (c) effective and (d) lawful. 
 
 
 
NORMATIVE OR EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS OF LEGITIMACY? 
 
Their paper was so thought-provoking paper that we asked Sun and colleagues if 
they would share the data. Given the fundamental importance of the finding 
regarding measurement, we were especially interested in the CFA modelling. But 
while the data were not forthcoming, it turned out that we did not need the data – 
and this only underlines the point we would like to make.  
To explain, imagine you are embarking on a new study into police legitimacy 
in a coastal city in South China. You begin with the received wisdom on the nature of 
legitimacy, i.e. Sun et al.’s (2018) study that showed that the residents of this 
coastal Chinese city judge the legitimacy of the police on the (roughly equal) bases 
of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. This key 
piece of work treated legitimacy as the joint distribution of these four constituent 
parts (i.e. it was represented as a second-order latent variable), legitimacy predicted 
cooperation, and the statistical effect was partly mediated by obligation to obey, 
which was treated as a potential outcome rather than constituent part of legitimacy 
(note that this second part of the study does not concern us here).  
You are interested in questioning the status quo. You want to reverse the 
logic of Tankebe (2013) and Sun et al. (2018). Rather than legitimacy being 
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness, you want to 
test a measurement model that (a) operationalises legitimacy as a more general 
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belief that the police are morally entitled to dictate appropriate behaviour, (b) 
treats procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as 
possible sources of legitimacy, and (c) allows it to be an empirical question 
whether citizens of this coastal Chinese city judge police legitimacy on the basis of 
the procedural justice and/or distributive justice and/or effectiveness and/or 
lawfulness displayed by police officers, using the sort of statistical analysis 
employed by Huq et al. (2017) and others (e.g. Sunshine & Tyler 2003).  
 Recall that Huq et al. (2017) found evidence for the empirical distinctiveness 
of various constructs using CFA (Figure 1). They called the constructs on the left-
hand side of the model possible sources of legitimacy and called the constructs on the 
right-hand side of the model constituent components of legitimacy. They did this because 
of prior theory, not because the CFA provided empirical proof of this conceptual 
designation. Your approach is different. Mirroring the reasoning of Tankebe, Sun 
and others, you start with an a priori conceptual stance that procedural justice, 
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are possible sources of legitimacy 
and conduct CFA to test whether you are in fact correct in the first place.  
So you obtain Sun et al.’s (2018) data, you fit a confirmatory factor model, 
and you obtain the results summarized in Figure 4. You find that the measures of 
the four constructs (a) scale well, (b) can be represented as four latent variables, (c) 
are strongly and positively correlated, and (d) that these correlations between the 
latent variables can be modelled according to a second-order factor. Having a priori 
labelled the second-order factor possible sources of legitimacy you argue that the finding 
constitutes empirical proof that they are possible sources of legitimacy not 
constituent components of legitimacy (note that this mirrors the reasoning in Sun 
et al. 2018). You claim that the finding over-turns current thinking on police 
legitimacy in this coastal Chinese city. You then move on to test a model linking 
the potential predictors of legitimacy to obligation to obey (Figure 5), possibly 
showing that procedural justice is the strongest predictor (see Sun et al. 2017 for 
exactly that analysis). 
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Figure 4 An alternative measurement model of legitimacy9 10 11 
 
9 Source: Sun, I. Y., Li, L., Wu, Y., & Hu, R. (2018). Police legitimacy and citizen cooperation in China: 
testing an alternative model. Asian Journal of Criminology, 13(4), 275-291. 
10 PSL = possible sources of legitimacy; PJ = procedural justice; EF = effectiveness; DJ = distributive 
justice; LF = lawfulness. 
11 Fit statistics: X2 = 206, df=50, p=<.005; CFI = .982; TLI = .976; RMSEA = .058; and SRMR = .030. 
Because this model fitted the data, and because the measures had good scaling properties, you argue that 
the second-order factor must be labeled constituent components of legitimacy not possible sources of legitimacy. 
 
Figure 5 Theoretical model of possible sources of legitimacy, legitimacy and 
cooperation12 
 
 12 PSL = possible sources of legitimacy; LG = legitimacy; CP = willingness to cooperate with the police. 
 
Imagine, then, taking a moment to reflect. Tankebe (2013) and Sun et al. (2018) 
began by saying that prior studies have treated procedural justice, distributive 
justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as possible sources of legitimacy. This was the 
status quo for them. They then claimed that the findings from their CFA 
modelling showed that these four constructs were in fact constituent components 
of legitimacy, presumably since the fitted CFA models in Figures 2 and 3 must be 
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incompatible with labelling the constructs possible sources of legitimacy. In the words 
of Sun et al. (2018: 14), procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and 
lawfulness are ‘indicators, rather than antecedents of legitimacy’. 
You are doing the opposite. You start with a different status quo, i.e. that 
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are constituent 
components of legitimacy (Sun et al. 2018). Because your CFA modelling shows 
good convergence validity, discriminant validity and internal consistency (to 
paraphrase Sun et al., 2018 14) and because you find that a second-order factor 
(that you label ‘possible sources of legitimacy’) model fitted the data, what have 
previously been treated as constituent components of legitimacy are in fact 
possible sources of legitimacy. You conclude, in other words, that you were 
correct in the first place in how you labelled the constructs, and that Sun et al. (2018) 
were incorrect in the first place when they labelled the construct constituent components 
of legitimacy. 
But a moment of reflection reveals that Figures 3 and 4 are identical, apart 
from the label given to the second-order factor. The model fits the data well 
regardless of what label we assign to the second-order factor. If both these 
different conceptual bases are consistent with the data (Figures 3 and 4), why 
would CFA provide empirical evidence on which of the two competing 
conceptual stances is ‘correct’? CFA is good at modelling correlations between 
variables according to some hypothesised latent structures. Whether one calls 
these constructs possible sources of legitimacy or constituent components of legitimacy 
depends on one’s conceptual stance, not on the basis of the CFA modelling. 
Moreover, to believe that CFA constitutes a test of the conceptual status of the 
constructs, you would have to reify latent variables in a particular way. Specifically, 
you would have to name the second-order factor before fitting the model, then 
interpret the fact that a second-order factor model fits the data as empirical proof 
that one was right to name the second-order factor in the way that you did, prior 
to doing the analysis.  
Indeed, it is difficult to know what would have needed to be present in a 
fitted CFA model if it was to fail the current empirical test. In Tankebe’s (2013) 
analysis it seems that if the fit of the model was reduced by adding effectiveness to 
the model, then this proves that the police do not have to be seen to act effectively 
if they are to be seen as legitimate by citizens. But why would that follow? It is a 
non sequitur: a less well fitting model would more likely indicate that there are 
cross-loadings and/or error covariances that should be added to the model. In Sun 
et al.’s (2018) analysis, it could be that a single second-order factor would not fit 
the data. But why would finding that one needs multiple second-order factors to 
explain why procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are 
correlated somehow prove that procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness 
and lawfulness are potential sources of legitimacy? Another non sequitur: there is 
no requirement that legitimacy is unidimensional. 
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TESTING THE CULTURAL (IN)SENSITIVITY OF THIS APPROACH 
TO MEASUREMENT: A THIRTY-COUNTRY STUDY 
 
So far in this paper we have discussed what latent variable modelling can and 
cannot say about an issue that is ultimately down to conceptual analysis and 
operational argumentation. In the second part of this paper we turn to cultural 
sensitivity. Recall that Sun et al. (2018) motivated their empirical strategy by saying 
that the approach of Tankebe (2013) offers a greater level of cultural sensitivity 
than the traditional approach to measuring legitimacy. In particular, they wanted to 
test the idea that the legitimation of the police is more complex in China than it is 
in contexts like the US, UK and Australia and this meant testing the idea that 
legitimacy has four dimensions using Tankebe’s (2013) approach.  
To reflect on the general extent of cultural sensitivity, we apply the approach 
to 30 different countries. Using the same approach to measuring and modelling 
legitimacy as Tankebe (2013), we fit the same CFA model in each country 
separately. We distinguish between procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness (Figure 6). Following Tankebe (2013) we a priori call 
these constituent components of legitimacy. 
 
Figure 6 Posited measurement model of potential sources of legitimacy13 
 
13 PJ = procedural justice; EF = effectiveness; DJ = distributive justice; LF = lawfulness. 
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DATA  
 
The ESS is an academically driven face-to-face interview survey that runs every 
two years. Charting a range of attitudes, values, behaviours and beliefs between 
nations and over time, it is one of the highest quality—if not the highest quality—
cross-national surveys in the world, especially in terms of sampling and 
measurement equivalence. It employs a rigorous questionnaire translation, pre-
testing and development methodology (Jowell et al. 2007). Although not all 
countries achieve it, the aspiration is that countries should have probability 
samples of the adult (16+) population, with high response rates, interviewed face-
to-face using CAPI (computer assisted personal interviewing). The questionnaire 
comprises an invariant core of questions asked of all respondents in each round. 
Also included in some rounds are rotating modules that focus in detail on a 
particular issue. Academics are invited to bid for space on the questionnaire in 
each round.  
In Round 5 a module on trust in justice containing 45 questions was included 
(European Social Survey 2011; Jackson et al. 2011; Hough et al. 2013). Fieldwork 
for Round 5 of the ESS was done in 2010/11 (European Social Survey 2010, 
2018). A total of 28 countries took part, some of which were European in only a 
loose sense: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and Ukraine. The probability samples 
are representative of all persons aged 15 and older resident within the borders of 
the nation, regardless of nationality, citizenship, language or legal status. The 
smallest sample size was 1,083 in Cyprus and the largest sample size was 3,031 in 
Germany.  
The US data come from an internet-based survey fielded to a random 
selection of individuals drawn from a GFK Knowledge Networks research panel 
of U.S. adults (Tyler & Jackson 2014; Tyler et al. 2015). Knowledge Networks uses 
random digit dialling and address-based sampling methods to construct and 
maintain the panel. A total of 2,561 respondents were initially selected from the 
larger panel. The study was described, an offer of compensation extended, and a 
reminder email was sent to all people on the list who had not responded after 
three days. The survey was fielded in August and September of 2012, either in 
English or in Spanish. A total of 1,603 individuals completed the survey, 
representing a response rate of 62.5% from the existing internet panel.  
The South Africa data come from the 2012 round of the South African Social 
Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted annually by 
the Human Sciences Research Council. The survey round consisted of a nationally 
representative probability sample of 3,183 South African adults aged 16 years and 
over living in private households. Each SASAS round of interviewing consists of a 
sub-sample of 500 Population Census enumeration areas (EAs), stratified by 
province, geographical sub-type and majority population group. The SASAS aims 
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to provide a long-term account of change in public values and the social fabric of 
modern South Africa. Given the importance of issues of crime and policing in 
South African society, permission was secured to field police-related questions 
from the trust in justice module included in the fifth round of the European Social 
Survey in 2010/11 (see Bradford et al. 2014).  
 
MEASURES 
 
Procedural justice was measured by asking respondents how often (from 1 ‘not at 
all often’ to 4 ‘very often’) they think that officers in their country:  
• treat people with respect; 
• make fair and impartial decisions; and, 
• explain their decisions and actions when asked. 
 
Police effectiveness was measured by asking respondents: ‘Based on what you 
have heard or your own experience, how successful do you think the police in this 
country are at…’ (on a scale from 0 to 10): 
• preventing crimes where violence is used or threatened;  
• catching people who commit house burglaries; and,  
• how slowly or quickly police would arrive at the scene if a violent crime 
were to occur near your house.  
 
Distributive justice was measured using two questions. The introduction was: 
‘Now some questions about whether or not the police in [country] treat victims of 
crime equally. Please answer based on what you have heard or your own 
experience.’ The first question was: ‘When victims report crimes, do you think the 
police treat rich people worse, poor people worse, or are rich and poor treated 
equally?’ The second question was: ‘when victims report crimes, do you think the 
police treat some people worse because of their race or ethnic group or is 
everyone treated equally?’ These two indicators were combined to form a single 
variable, with 0 equalling ‘neither poor nor minority group members are treated 
worse’, 1 equalling ‘either poor or minority group members are treated worse’ and 
2 equalling ‘both poor and minority group members are treated worse’. Finally, 
lawfulness was measured by asking people (a) to agree or disagree with the 
statement ‘Decisions and actions of police are unduly influenced by political 
pressure’ on a 5-point Likert scale and (b) ‘How often do police [in your country] 
take bribes’ on a scale from 0 ‘never’ to 10 ‘always’. These two variables were 
rescaled, such that high scores equals the belief that the police act lawfully. A 
single index was created by taking the mean of the two variables (having divided 
the bribery variable by two, to put it on a comparable scale to the political pressure 
variable). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335644 
  
Jackson and Bradford           Blurring the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Legitimacy 
 
 17 
Note that a strength of the data is that the same measures were fielded in 
nationally representative sample surveys of 30 countries. A weakness is that the 
measures of distributive justice and lawfulness were limited to two each. The 
measures of distributive justice were nominal with three categories each, and the 
measures of lawfulness were one five category variable and one ten category 
variable. As such, it makes sense to produce a single derived variable for 
distributive justice and a single derived variable for lawfulness. In the context of 
confirmatory factor analysis, this does mean we can test a model exactly like 
Tankebe’s (2013). But it is close enough because the CFA is still assessing, among 
other things, whether these are four empirically distinct constructs (Figure 6). 
Note, also, that we do not fit a second-order factor. This is because the extra 
testable assumption at the heart of a second-order factor is unnecessary. It 
involves testing whether the correlations between the four latent constructs can be 
modelled according to a single underlying second-order latent construct, but as 
detailed above, if one finds that the second-order factor model fits, why would this 
increase one’s confidence that the four constructs are constituent components of 
legitimacy rather than possible sources of legitimacy? The researcher is free to call 
the second-order factor whatever she likes. In addition, Sun et al. (2018) sought to 
replicate Tankebe (2013) and he presented legitimacy as multi-dimensional and did 
not fit a second-order factor. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 provides the exact and approximate fit statistics for the CFA model 
(Figure 6) that differentiates between procedural justice (a latent construct with 
three indicators), effectiveness (another latent construct with three indicators), 
distributive justice (a manifest indicator calculated using responses to two 
indicators) and lawfulness (another manifest indicator calculated using responses 
to two indicators). We discount the exact fit statistics because the Chi-square tests 
is extremely sensitive to sample size (very small deviations in the match between 
the hypothesised and saturated models can be highlighted as statistically 
significant). The approximate fit statistics are adequate in all countries, with 
RMSEA <.08, CFI >.95 and TLI >.95 in every case. 
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Table 1 Fit statistics for the fitted confirmatory factor analysis model in each of 
the 30 countries14 
Country 
Chi-
square df p-value 
RMSEA 
95% CI CFI TLI 
Austria 149 16 <0.001 .061 [.052, .070] .987 .978 
Belgium 146 16 <0.001 .069 [.059, .080] .956 .923 
Bulgaria 110 16 <0.001 .050 [.041, .059] .992 .986 
Croatia 154 16 <0.001 .073 [.063, .083] .973 .953 
Cyprus 69 16 <0.001 .055 [.042, .069] .991 .985 
Czech Republic 157 16 <0.001 .061 [.063, .070] .982 .968 
Denmark 103 16 <0.001 .059 [.048, .070] .968 .945 
Estonia 91 16 <0.001 .051 [.042, .062] .979 .963 
Finland 78 16 <0.001 .046 [.036, .056] .980 .965 
France 120 16 <0.001 .061 [.051, .072] .974 .954 
Germany 143 16 <0.001 .051 [.044, .059] .974 .955 
Greece 99 16 <0.001 .044 [.036, .052] .995 .991 
Hungary 51 16 <0.001 .038 [.026, .050] .989 .981 
Ireland 142 16 <0.001 .055 [.047, .064] .986 .975 
Israel 184 16 <0.001 .068 [.060, .077] .980 .965 
Lithuania 74 16 <0.001 .047 [.036, .058] .986 .976 
Netherlands 129 16 <0.001 .062 [.052, .072] .962 .933 
Norway 131 16 <0.001 .068 [.058, .079] .957 .924 
Poland 83 16 <0.001 .049 [.039, .060] .985 .974 
Portugal 186 16 <0.001 .070 [.061, .080] .973 .953 
Russian Federation 174 16 <0.001 .062 [.054, .071] .984 .971 
Slovakia 139 16 <0.001 .065 [.055, .075] .982 .969 
Slovenia 93 16 <0.001 .059 [.047, .071] .982 .968 
South Africa 182 16 <0.001 .065 [.056, .073] .986 .976 
Spain 50 16 <0.001 .033 [.023, .044] .994 .990 
Sweden 101 16 <0.001 .060 [.049, .071] .963 .935 
Switzerland 70 16 <0.001 .047 [.036, .059] .978 .962 
Ukraine 95 16 <0.001 .051 [.041, .061] .990 .982 
United Kingdom 99 16 <0.001 .046 [.038, .055] .988 .979 
United States 96 16 <0.001 .056 [.046, .067] .989 .981 
 
14 Data: Round 5 European Social Survey, Yale xxx Survey and SASAS 2010. 
 
Table 2 provides details of the scaling properties of procedural justice and 
effectiveness in each country. Each cell gives the standardized factor loading (left) 
and R2 (right) for each particular indicator (PJ1, PJ2, PJ3, EFF1, EFF2 and EFF3) 
in each of the 30 different countries. For procedural justice, the standardized 
factor loadings range from .59 to .94, and the R2s range from .35 to .88. For 
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effectiveness, the standardized factor loadings range from .44 to .90, and the R2s 
range from .20 to .80. Because the factors loadings and R2s are all relatively high, 
this indicates good scaling properties. 
 
Table 2 Standardized factor loadings and R2s for the PJ and EFF indicators15 
 Country PJ1 PJ2 PJ3 EFF1 EFF2 EFF3 
Austria .88 / .77 .93 / .87 .72 / .52 .80 / .65 .78 / .61 .78 / .60 
Belgium .78 / .61 .73 / .53 .65 / .42 .75 / .56 .70 / .49 .52 / .28 
Bulgaria .90 / .81 .93 / .87 .80 / .63 .85 /.72 .79 / .63 .71 / .51 
Croatia .84 / .71 .83 / .69 .78 / .60 .86 / .75 .83 / .69 .70 / .48 
Cyprus .88 /.77 .93 / .86 .80 / .64 .83 / .69 .79 / .63 .75 / .56 
Czech 
Republic .88 / .78 .88 / .77 .71 / .50 .78 / .61 .68 / .46 .70 / .50 
Denmark .77 / .59 .80 / .64 .70 / .48 .77 / .59 .53 / .28 .56 / .31 
Estonia .81 / .65 .81 / .65 .65 / .43 .70 / .49 .67 / .45 .61 / .37 
Finland .74 / .55 .80 / .64 .65 / .43 .70 / .49 .70 / .49 .54 / .29 
France .77 / .60 .84 / .70 .63 / .40 .77 / .59 .74 / .54 .63 / .39 
Germany .74 / .55 .82 / .67 .59 / .35 .67 / .45 .66 / .43 .55 / .30 
Greece .89 / .79 .94 / .88 .77 / .60 .86 / .74 .90 / .80 .81 / .66 
Hungary .82 / .68 .87 / .75 .62 / .38 .80 / .64 .75 / .56 .57 / .33 
Ireland .83 / .69 .91 / .82 .74 / .54 .80 / .63 .69 / .47 .66 / .43 
Israel .86 / .74 .86 / .73 .80 / .63 .78 / .60 .68 / .47 .61 / .37 
Lithuania .75 / .56 .83 / .68 .78 / .60 .83 / .69 .79 / .63 .64 / .41 
Netherlands .78 / .61 .79 / .62 .62 / .39 .71 / .50 .64 / .41 .56 / .32 
Norway .85 / .72 .68 / .47 .62 / .38 .73 / .53 .69 / .48 .62 / .39 
Poland .81 / .66 .84 / .71 .76 / .58 .81 / .65 .78 / .61 .65 / .42 
Portugal .77 / .60 .87 / .76 .79 / .62 .77 / .59 .78 / .61 .73 / .53 
Russian 
Federation .84 / .70 .89 / .80 .77 / .59 .81 / .66 .80 / .64 .70 / .48 
Slovakia .83 /. 69 .91 / .83 .76 / .58 .83 / .69 .79 / .62 .65 / .43 
Slovenia .83 / .69 .92 / .85 .67 / .45 .80 / .63 .78 / .60 .62 / .38 
South Africa .87 / .76 .91 / .83 .79 / .62 .83 / .69 .78 / .61 .80 / .64 
Spain .84 / .71 .89 / .79 .70 / .49 .82 / .67 .76 / .57 .66 / .44 
Sweden .70 / .48 .73 / .53 .70 / 49 .76 / .58 .70 / .50 .56 / .31 
Switzerland .76 / .58 .76 / .58 .68 / .46 .74 / .55 .78 / .61 .44 / .20 
Ukraine .83 / .69 .92 / .84 .84 / .70 .84 / .70 .84 / .70 .75 / .56 
United 
Kingdom .86 / .73 .87 / .76 .70 / .49 .75 / .56 .71 / .50 .64 / .41 
United States .92 / .84 .79 / .63 .84 / .70 .85 / .71 .73 / .53 .72 / .52 
 
15 Data: Round 5 European Social Survey, Yale xxx Survey and SASAS 2010. 
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Table 3 provides the correlations between the four constructs. Looking across the 
30 countries, the pair of constructs with the strongest correlation is procedural 
justice and effectiveness (ranges from .45 to .77) and the pair of constructs with 
the weakest correlation is distributive justice and lawfulness (ranges from .06 to 
.42).  
 
Table 3 Correlations between constructs from the fitted measurement model16 
 Country 
PJ 
WITH 
EFF 
PJ 
WITH 
DJ 
PJ 
WITH 
LF 
EFF 
WITH 
DJ 
EFF 
WITH 
LF 
DJ 
WITH 
LF 
Austria .63 .54 .43 .47 .42 .42 
Belgium .51 .32 .36 .23 .28 .19 
Bulgaria .76 .49 .55 .47 .52 .42 
Croatia .71 .54 .48 .49 .40 .32 
Cyprus .70 .44 .52 .41 .46 .34 
Czech Republic .70 .46 .53 .39 .39 .31 
Denmark .58 .38 .27 .35 .25 .22 
Estonia .67 .39 .47 .34 .41 .35 
Finland .52 .32 .38 .27 .21 .25 
France .64 .45 .40 .30 .38 .32 
Germany .55 .35 .32 .36 .29 .28 
Greece .77 .40 .56 .37 .49 .33 
Hungary .65 .47 .51 .40 .38 .37 
Ireland .68 .41 .43 .42 .39 .33 
Israel .71 .40 .32 .38 .27 .19 
Lithuania .69 .42 .45 .41 .36 .29 
Netherlands .45 .38 .29 .26 .16 .19 
Norway .53 .31 .31 .29 .16 .17 
Poland .63 .46 .47 .41 .41 .37 
Portugal .51 .41 .37 .44 .47 .34 
Russian Federation .75 .42 .41 .40 .36 .25 
Slovakia .64 .39 .45 .40 .42 .29 
Slovenia .64 .43 .42 .43 .36 .36 
South Africa .54 .43 .33 .41 .27 .24 
Spain .68 .45 .45 .40 .41 .34 
Sweden .55 .33 .29 .34 .09 .18 
Switzerland .52 .36 .34 .30 .25 .29 
Ukraine .69 .30 .31 .32 .25 .06 
United Kingdom .62 .38 .35 .37 .33 .28 
United States .67 .48 .61 .34 .49 .40 
 
16 Data: Round 5 European Social Survey, Yale xxx Survey and SASAS 2010. 
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Applying the reasoning of Tankebe (2013) and Sun et al. (2018) we could interpret 
the fact that the four-factor model fitted the data in each of the 30 countries as 
evidence that what have previously treated as possible sources of legitimacy are in 
fact constituent components of legitimacy. This would imply that legitimacy rests 
on the same normative bases in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
Ukraine and US. It follows that in each of these diverse social, political and legal 
contexts, the police need to be seen to act in ways that are procedurally just, 
distributively just, effective and lawful if they are to be seen as legitimate.  
Indeed, it is not that procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and 
lawfulness are all strong predictors of legitimacy in each of the 30 countries, it is 
that they are so fundamental to the perceived right to power that they collective 
constitute the construct. This would contradict existing work that (a) assumes that 
procedural justice is not the same as (or not part of) legitimacy, (b) finds that 
procedural justice is a stronger predictor of legitimacy than distributive justice, 
effectiveness or lawfulness, and (c) highlights country-level differences in the 
extent to which each explains variation in legitimacy. We return to this point in the 
discussion below.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We began this commentary by describing how the empirical concept of legitimacy 
(Hinsch 2008) specifies the right to power as a property of public opinion (e.g. 
people in Japan may view their police to be more legitimate than by people in 
Russian Federation) and treats it as an empirical question the criteria that citizens 
of a given country use to judge the legitimacy of the institution (e.g. people in 
Japan may judge the legitimacy of the police according to a different set of criteria 
compared to people in Russian Federation). This is in contrast to the normative 
concept of legitimacy, which involves an outsider observer determining the 
substantive requirements for legitimacy in different contexts (e.g. police in both 
Japan and Russian Federation may be judged by the outside expert according to 
the same criteria like, for instance, independence, accountability and other 
indicators of the rule of law). 
We then described the methodology used by Sun et al. (2018) and Tankebe 
(2013) to test the validity and reliability of a new approach to measuring empirical 
police legitimacy. In Sun et al.’s (2018) study the scales of procedural justice, 
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness had good measurement 
properties; they loaded on four strongly correlated latent variables (labelled 
procedural justice, distributive justice, lawfulness and effectiveness); and these four latent 
constructs were themselves regressed onto a single second-order factor that the 
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researchers a priori labelled legitimacy. The researchers subsequently argued that, on 
this evidence base, they are such strong criteria on which people use to judge 
police legitimacy that they can be treated as constituent components of legitimacy.  
We then took the reader through a hypothetical reanalysis of Sun et al.’s 
(2018) data. Taking a different starting point but following the same logical 
sequence, we reached the conclusion that what has previously been viewed as four 
constituent components of legitimacy in this coastal Chinese city (procedural 
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness) are in fact possible 
sources of legitimacy. The scales of procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness had good measurement properties; they loaded on 
four strongly correlated latent variables (labelled procedural justice, distributive justice, 
lawfulness and effectiveness); and these four latent constructs were themselves 
regressed onto a single second-order factor that you a priori labelled possible sources of 
legitimacy. This thought experiment illustrated the simple point that the findings of 
the CFA modelling do not tell whether one is right in the first place to define 
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as (a) potential 
normative criteria that people use to judge legitimacy or (b) actual constituent 
components of legitimacy. This is not a good adjudication tool because the same 
fitted model is consistent with both conceptual stances. 
We then investigated whether the approach generally lacks cultural sensitivity. 
We linked Round 5 of the European Social Survey (ESS) to two matching 
representative sample surveys of US and South Africa. This produces a 30-country 
data dataset spanning countries as diverse as Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Israel, South Africa, Russian Federation, Spain, UK, US and Ukraine. Analysing 
data from these 30 countries to test whether Tankebe’s (2013) four-factor model 
fitted in each social, political and legal context, we found that the model (specified 
in Figure 6) did indeed fit the data in each of the 30 countries. In each and every 
country, measures of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and 
lawfulness scaled reasonably well; reflected or formed four empirically distinct 
constructs; and were strongly and positive correlated with each other. Applying 
the reasoning of Sun and colleagues, this would imply that legitimacy is, in each 
and every one of those countries, the same thing, i.e. it is comprised of public 
assessments of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness, and 
lawfulness. By extension, the legitimating norms that people expect police to abide 
by (before the institution is to be viewed as legitimate) are the same in all countries 
and relate to these four areas.  
We believe this would be a misfounded view. The fact that the model fitted 
the data well in each country says little about whether we are measuring, accurately 
or not, legitimacy. The claim that we are doing so is a purely conceptual matter 
based on an a priori assumption about what constitutes legitimacy in a particular 
context and how it can reasonably be operationalised. Moreover, because the 
approach ends up imposing onto 30 different social, political and legal contexts 
the idea that that people in each different country judge the legitimacy of the 
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police on roughly speaking the same bases (procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness), we have what is rather curious mix of the normative 
concept and the empirical concept of legitimacy. Public opinion matters with 
regard to levels of legitimacy in a given society, but it is the researcher who is 
imposing the substantive requirements for empirical legitimacy (i.e. procedural 
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness) in each and every context.  
This is where the problem arises. As shown in the analysis of the ESS data, 
this would lead to the rather odd conclusion that legitimacy is constituted in the 
same way in UK, US, Russia, South Africa and Israel, to say nothing of the other 
countries shown. In other words, in each of these diverse countries the claim 
would be that as long as someone believes the police are procedurally and 
distributively just, effective, and behave in a lawful manner, then they believe the 
police to be legitimate. In practice, therefore, far from being sensitive to cultural 
variation in the composition of legitimacy, the model proposed by Tankebe, Sun 
and colleagues flattens out the possibility of variation because it assumes 
beforehand that these judgements concern procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness.  
There are three obvious problems with such a proposition. First, one could 
take a quite reasonably normative view that police should act in procedurally just, 
distributively just, effective and lawful ways, and moreover that being seen to do 
so is so fundamental that their perceived right to power rests directly on of the 
four public perceptions. If policy makers in a given country do recognise the 
importance of being seen by those they serve, protect and police as legitimate, 
then framing these as constituent components of legitimacy could initially be an 
effective rhetorical device. But why would one need a potentially spurious reason 
to argue that police should act in procedurally just, distributively just, effective and 
lawful ways when a more convincing general normative case can be made? 
Moreover, studies showing, for instance, that effectiveness is not a particularly 
important predictor of legitimacy (defined and measured as a more general 
perception of normative appropriateness) could subsequently undermine the 
empirical argument. 
Second, and relatedly, there is little or no possibility of assessing which if any 
is the most important component of legitimacy. What type or aspect of police 
behaviour is most important in generating a sense among the policed that police 
activity is normatively justifiable? Do people value procedural justice most? Or are 
they more concerned with effectiveness? These seem to us important questions, 
both theoretically and from a policy perspective. Yet the approach to measuring 
legitimacy taken above makes it difficult if not impossible to answer them. If one 
wants to test whether people judge the legitimacy of the police on different criteria 
according to local societal norms, values, institutional structures and context, one 
needs a strategy that has the requisite cultural sensitivity. 
The third problem with the approach taken above is that it leaves no room 
for the fact that other judgements might come into play when people are thinking 
about the normative appropriateness of police activity. These might be many and 
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varied, and some might be morally troubling from a normative perspective. Some 
white US citizens, for example, might believe police are behaving appropriately 
when they target black US citizens, not because they think this makes policing 
more effective or fair – although they might also believe this – but because they 
have been socialised or otherwise come to believe this is just the way police should 
behave. Given the history of the US vis-à-vis many other liberal democracies 
(Alexander 2012), there is no necessary reason to assume this would be the case 
elsewhere, although of course it might be. This is, to our minds, an empirical 
question worthy of investigation. But the model specified above renders such 
investigation analytically and conceptually difficult. One would have to assume, for 
example, that racially targeted policing in a given context is only generative of 
legitimacy to the extent that it influences beliefs about fairness, effectiveness and 
lawfulness. If it does not, then it has no effect on legitimacy. In fact, nothing could 
have an effect on legitimacy if it did not have an effect on at least one of the four 
constructs. 
The answer to all these problems is obvious and is already employed in much 
of the literature. If legitimacy is conceptualized and measured as something 
distinct from assessments of fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness, then it is 
possible to assess which if any of the these is most important as a predictor of 
(formative judgements constituting) legitimacy. Similarly, if legitimacy is distinct 
and different from the four factors, then the influence of other variables is 
conceptually and analytically far easier to assess, since other judgements of the 
normative appropriateness of police activity are allowed to have effects distinct 
from any correlation with perceptions of fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness. 
For instance, respecting the limits of one’s rightful authority may be important to 
legitimacy above and beyond perceptions of the procedural justice of the police 
(Huq et al. 2017; Trinkner et al. 2018).   
To close, we do think there is space for alternative approaches to measuring 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is an abstract and unobservable psychological construct, 
and there are numerous ways to operationalise the perceived right to power, aside 
from the standard ways of institutional trust and/or normative alignment and/or 
obligation to obey (Tyler & Jackson 2013). But researchers need to be aware of the 
limits of different approaches when trying to decide which approach to 
measurement is preferable. In the current case, the methodology of Sun and 
colleagues means ironically imposing top-down rather than discovering bottom-up the 
normative content of legitimacy. There may be normative and/or theoretical 
and/or practical reasons to decide this but it is, in our view, crucial to be clear that 
this is what one is doing, especially when the analytical strategy offers little 
empirical support for the central conceptual claim. 
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